The Nature of Believing
David Hunter,
PhilPapers,
Feb 02, 2023
I am somewhat in agreement with this paper (which feels a lot longer than it is) in which David Hunter argues for a conception of mind that "has a rational agent at its heart, one whose acts, thoughts, and feelings can depend on how things are or could be, including how she is and could be" but in which "neither knowing nor believing essentially involves representing those facts and possibilities." Rather, "they involve being so positioned that those facts and possibilities can explain what one does, thinks, and feels." Somewhat, because I'm not sure how possibilities, including especially counterfactuals, can be 'facts' about the external world. I'm also hesitant to ascribe 'being good', however it's defined, as a motivation for beliefs and actions. But I can understand how you could describe physical systems that can act rationally without internal representational states, which is what Hunter is up to here. Image: Frontiers.
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