Scientific Models and Representation
Gabriele Contessa,
PhilPapers,
Jul 17, 2009
I am more-or-less inclined to agree with this perspective of scientific models. "There seems to be nothing more (or less, for that matter) to a scientific model representing a real-world system than its being used by someone as an epistemic representation of that system." By that, what we mean is that the representation is used to make inferences about whatever it represents. Of course, what constitutes a (legitimate) inference varies from context to context. Where we, in ordinary discourse, might quite appropriately infer, a scientist may impose more rigorous constraints. Additionally, we want to construe 'inference' quite broadly. My own epistemology includes a range of inference based on similarity - that is, pattern-matching - that are non-propositional and non-truth-preserving. These, nonetheless, can constitute scientific models. All of that said, Contessa's paper is quite good and well worth a read. Via It's Only a Theory.
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