I frequently become impatient when people want to begin by defining things (for example, 'learning objects'). Not because I don't think we should be clear, but because the process of definition then commences with little or no reflection on what constitutes a definition. This paper is an exercise in that sort of reflection. It's of fairly narrow scope, but it does allow me to make here the point that there are many types of definition, and that not all types of definition are appropriate to all things. The usual lexical definition ('P' is a thing if class C that has defining feature F) only works in a well definied (and agreed upon) ontology. A logical definition (P is a Q if and only if P is an A,B, and C) only works is the term being defined is cohesive (as opposed to what Wittgenstein calls a 'family resemblance). An ostensive definition (this is a P) only works if there is point to and, as Quine observes, agreement on the sort of things that are pointed to. A functional definition (P is something that does Q, or P is something that is used to do Q) works only if the object has a function. Definitions are not straightforward, and the demand that discussion begin with a definition is usually a means of attempting to circumvent some of the difficult questions through stipulation. PDF.
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