The concept of 'cognitive penetrability' is the idea that the cognitive states are causally dependent on cognitive states, where it is the mental content of the cognitive state that matters. In the case of pain, this appears to be well-documented. If you believe that you have been injured, there is often a corresponding pain. That's what this paper investigates. The objection (very much abridged) is that what we are seeing in the case is one perception directly impacting another perception; there might be no need for cognitive mediation. Cognitive penetrability depends on a three-stage process: first, transduction, in which a sensation "is transformed into a suitable symbolic representation'; second, systems that "take symbols in, manipulate them, and pass the resulting symbols on," and then third, the intentional steps, where beliefs "are combined with other beliefs in an inferential, truth-preserving way."
Cognitive science is concerned almost entirely with the second step, but this assumes a functioning first step. Not only might this never actually happen, the experience of pain actually seems to be immune from it - we often feel pain despite what we know and believe (consider, for example, the phantom limb syndrome). I personally don't think the notion of cognitive penetrability is coherent, which is one reason why I am sceptical of cognitive science, and cognitive psychology in general. Consider, by contrast, how much of educational theory is based in cognitive psychology, and how fragile that foundation actually is. Anyhow, this is quite a good paper bringing us up to date on this debate.
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