I'm more or less generally supportive of the argument in this article, which is worth reading in full rather than depending on my summary. The argument is that things like beliefs and desires are dispositions - not the narrowly defined behavioural dispositions of, say, Gilbert Ryle, but 'liberal' dispositions, which the author classes as behavioural, phenomenal, and cognitive. I don't think we really need this categorization - I'm thinking some account of causal dispositions - for example, a neural network (say) would respond in a characteristic way given the right sort of input or activation state. This neural response comes with all the attributes of a desire or belief - a certain phenomenal feel, an inclination to behave in certain ways, a tendency to have certain thoughts or internal experiences. As Eric Schwitzgebel says, "Once your dispositional profile is fully characterized, that's the end of the story as far as the existence or non-existence of desire is concerned." Related: Dispositional learning analytics and formative assessment: an inseparable twinship.
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