This review offers an excellent summary of recent work in philosophy on the problem of consciousness. It is written for philosophers current in the field, so you sort of have to insert yourself into the debate. To me, we can frame the key question as follows: can there be consciousness without conceptualization? " Christopher Hill argues, according to the review, "that a posteriori materialism fails to answer KA and other arguments because it holds, as he says, 'awareness of qualia always involves conceptualization'." This is one of those horrible knots philosophers tie themselevs into when they ask, "what must be the case prior to i for i?" If the answer is "nothing," then they say, "well, then, why i?" And if you can't answer that (which would entail answering the first question," then they say, "thus, i isn't the basis of knowledge; something else must be." Arraugh!
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